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ANDRÁS SAJÓ * 
 
The Impacts of EU Accession on Post-communist 
Constitutionalism 
 
 
Abstract. One of the persistent fears regarding the accession countries envisions that these 
countries will not catch up with the prevailing practices of constitutionalism and the rule of law 
that allegedly constitute the common tradition of Europe. 
 It is believed, and in many regards rightly so, that accession to the Union will push Eastern 
Europe towards the values and institutional settings of modernity. Given the process and political 
consequences of the accession, as well as for other, historical and cultural reasons, the short 
term modernization effects of the membership might be limited, even counterproductive. This 
paper discusses the impact of the current “Europeanization” on the public understanding 
and institutional structures of constitutional democracy in the new member states. Further, it 
evaluates the foreseeable impacts of the emerging European Constitution on the constitutional 
structures (the new checks and balances) in the new member states, except the human rights 
aspects of constitutionalism.  
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Introduction 
 
One of the persistent fears in the European Union is that the accession countries 
will be unable to catch up with the prevailing practices of constitutionalism and 
the rule of law that supposedly ground the common tradition of Europe. This 
fear is rationalized when considering that unbridled nationalism necessarily 
impacts upon territorial stability. There are other concerns regarding the weak-
ness of democratic tradition especially after the years of totalitarian rule. It is 
believed that the institutional systems in place for enforcing the rule of law1 
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1
 In fact, both new and old member states confront with some difficulty the aggressive 
enforcement of bureaucratic (excessively bounded) rationalism that relies on Union supremacy 
to the detriment of nation-state level constitutionalism. For the old member states see, e.g., 
the Alcan decision. C 24/95, Alcan II, [1997] ECR I-1591. [German rule of law concept 
disregarded by the ECJ]. 
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merely exist in a formal sense rather than in terms of self-sustaining value 
commitments. The scope of this chapter does not allow for an analysis into the 
truth of such assumptions. It is undeniable that extremist nationalism is not 
absent in the rhetoric, and sometimes actual policies, of Eastern European 
political elites who in turn find popular endorsement for their nationalistic 
campaigns.2 These nationalistic sentiments will be echoed once the population 
of new member states will be confronted with negative experiences as a result 
of them being unable to successfully articulate their special interests in a great 
“empire”; unfavorable comparisons of “Brussels as the new imperial power” 
with the “yoke of the Soviet empire” has already been made in many former 
communist countries.  
 One of the striking features of East European nationalism is that it is 
embedded in a value system that is (at best) indifferent to modernity as it 
grounds itself in past (ascribed and mystical) national glory. This belief does 
not generate much interest in the ethics of modernity as put forward in the rule 
of law (rational accountability for one’s acts, transparency, predictability 
through formalism, etc). Modernists (modernizers) argue that accession will 
change attitudes toward modernization among large segments of the popu-
lation. However, given the process of accession and the way the new Union 
is shaped, firm, popular commitment to an efficient democracy as well as the 
belief in popular self-government, such an efficient responsive and responsible 
modern institutional system has limited opportunities to prevail beyond the 
institutional façade. Citizens of the new member states might become Zwangs-
demokraten (forced democrats).3 This is problematic because so long as the 
new European constitutional identity remains an unfinished and uncertain 
project (an imposed mask) there will be only limited offering of a modernizing 
identity. It is also true that the Eastern European political elite seems to have a 
very instrumentalist disregard4 for the rule of law even though formal legalism 

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2
 The Summer, 2003 Gallup poll indicates that although many Hungarians and 
Estonians identify themselves as citizens of the nation-state only (39 per cent) this is not 
particularly high compared to Great Britain (64 per cent). However, there was no Hungarian 
who would have identified himself/herself as “European only”. Hungarian identity correlates 
with age but not with party affiliation. 
 
3
 The term was used by a German journalist in regard to the late Bavarian Prime 
Minister Franz-Joseph Strauss. Of course, given certain historical circumstances the progress 
to genuine democracy might lead through imposed democracy. 
 
4
 It is quite telling that the Hungarian Government’s chief delegate to the European 
Convention who joined overwhelming majority of the delegates signing a document 
proposing that the new Constitution should be adopted by national referenda, stated in 
Hungary that he does not find appropriate to call a referendum; his signature was added as 
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is at least accepted. (Even Meciar accepted unfavorable decisions of the Slovak 
Constitutional Court.) 
 Instrumentalism and the hidden contempt of the rule of law and constitu-
tional values in general are confronted with a normative committment to 
constitutionalism and the rule of law which programmatically exists in the 
“older” member states. 
 So long as “European solutions” are felt as being imposed and detrimental to 
local self-interests, “modernity” (i.e. efficiency considerations and pragmatism 
in decision-making, irrespective of traditional values and communitarian 
sentiments) will be detested. However it could be that those national institutions 
beyond national democratic control and interrelated with European institu-
tional networks may create institutions within the traditional national(istic) 
states that serve democracy. 
 It is believed, and in many regards rightly so, that accession to the Union 
will push Eastern Europe towards the values and institutional settings of 
modernity. Modernity, in allowing for interest group collective action, can 
be considered a mixed blessing. Interest group politics behind European 
centralization is neither particularly conducive to a robust republican design of 
democracy nor does it contribute to fairness with regards to the protection of 
minority and other vulnerable groups.5 As a result of these shortcomings 
relating not only to the process but also the political, historical and cultural 
consequences of accession the effect of modernization might, in the short term, 
be limited and perhaps even quite the opposite. Furthermore, the ambiguities of 
the European project could reinforce pre-modern values within acceding 
states. The current practices of constitutional public politics are limited to 
electoral participation of limited relevance for the decision-making. In other 
words, the rational discourse that allows for intellectual formation, the acceptance 
of governmental decisions and a more engaging decision-making process is 
absent. 
 In this paper I will look at the present impact of “Europeanization” on public 
understanding of constitutional democracy and the institutional structures put 
in place within new member states. I will then briefly consider the foreseeable 
                               
part of the horse trading that took place at the negotiations. This is a telling, though by 
large not unique, example of the understanding of the binding force of contracts, both in 
the public and among the political elite. 
 
5
 On the new European constitutional design as a project of centralization related to 
special interest group interest representation where they are loosing at the national level, 
see Ruta, M.: The Allocation of Competencies in an International Union: A Positive 
Analysis, http://www/ecb/int/pub/wp/ecbwp220.pdf 
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impact of the emerging European Constitution on the constitutional structures 
(the new checks and balances) of new member states. Due to the scope of this 
chapter, I will not address the human rights dimension of constitutionalism. I 
will consider, in particular, the formation, and distortion, of constitutional 
democratic politics in the accession process particularly with regard to the 
referenda and the constitutional structures that have emerged thus far in the 
new member states. The politics of accession and other governmental practices 
remain highly instrumentalist. Such instrumentalism diminishes the likelihood 
that the general public will cherish the virtues of deliberative democracy and 
tempered majoritarianism.  
 Relying primarily on the Hungarian experience I will analyze the potential 
changes in the democratic and constitutional ethos as a result of the emerging 
allocation of powers in the new Union. The constitutionalist inspiration that 
transpires from the debate on the European Constitution as well as the draft 
itself is highly problematic as a blueprint for “transformative constitution-
alism.”6 
 My first claim is that the accession process as well as the drafting of the 
European Constitution has reinforced a the irrelevance of constitutional 
democracy in the eyes of the public who continue to see it as a matter of 
majoritarianism. It remains to be seen how the emerging European Union model 
of pluricentric separation of powers (“network constitutionalism”) will be 
understood and used democratically by the citizens of the new member states. 
 My second claim is that, outside of the genuinely free elections firmly 
entrenched within new member states, certain patterns of state socialism are 
going to be reinforced through membership to the Union. Democratic politics 
is understood for many people as a tool of maintaining free public services, 
irrespective of contribution or need (except the needs of service providers). 
Such trends might be reinforced whist converting local constitutional politics 
to the European level. The experiences of the accession process indicate that 
democratic participation and parliamentarism are often quite formal. Instead 
of genuine participatory politics and accountability, democracy becomes an 
opportunity to influence politics in order to maximize welfare services. Union 

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6
 Transformative constitutionalism is about openness to the future and it is based on 
a critical relationship to the past. In the distinction of preservative and transformative 
constitutions I follow Cass Sunstein, Designing Democracy. New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2001. 67.  
 On the pre-modern traditionalism of post-communist constitutions see Sajó, A.: 
Preferred Generations: A Paradox of Restoration Constitutions. Cardozo Law Review, 14 
(1993) 847–864.  
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law and policies reinforce the welfare entitlement attitudes of the East 
European public. The Union has its own social welfarist value system (or 
routine) which reinforces the inherited welfarist expectations in the new 
member states. In these countries the use of resources for the maintenance of 
European Union type welfare systems might be counterproductive and 
contribute to the difficulty in creating a robust democratic and constitutional 
culture. 
 
 
I. Constitutional structures and the thinning of majoritarian democracy 
  
A. “Europe Clauses”—Preservative constitutionalism 
 
Eastern European accession countries have recent constitutions that were 
created after the collapse of communism.7 The Estonian Constitution (1992) 
(Art. 1),8 and the Czech and Slovak constitutions (1992) declare the respective 
countries to be sovereign, while Poland (1997), Hungary (1990 amendment), 
Latvia (1992), Lithuania (1992) and Slovenia (1991) refer to independence. 
Lithuania’s Constitution also states that people’s sovereignty cannot be limited. 
Even in cases where the Constitution is less unequivocal (as in Hungary) 
prevailing national sentiment is well represented in the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court. Here a very traditional concept of sovereignty (see below) 
has been agreed upon which in turn has resulted in the restrictive wording of 
the Europe clause in Hungary. The transfer of public powers is not possible. 
Only the transfer of the right to exercise certain powers is allowed since such a 
transfer cannot be based on the ultimate source of sovereignty—the Hungarian 
people.9 
 This concern with state sovereignty as a basis for independence is 
remarkable when compared with Western European constitutions where the 
matter is either not discussed at all, or is not made explicit (see e.g. Austria,10 

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7
 The Hungarian Constitution is technically the Constitution of 1949 but it was fully 
amended in 1989 with several additional revisions since then. 
 
8
 “Estonia is an independent and sovereign democratic republic wherein the supreme 
power of the state is held by the people.” The formulation follows closely Art. 1 of the 
1938 Estonian constitution which is the basis of the adoption by referendum of the 1992 
constitution, as expressly stated in the Preamble of the 1992 Constitution. 
 
9
 See for example Várhelyi, O.: Hungary. In: Ott, A.—Inglis, K. (eds.): Handbook on 
European Enlargement. The Hague, 2002. 264. 
 
10
 The Austrian Constitution states (Art. 1) that her legal order originates in the people. 
This, of course, can be seen as a reference to sovereignty. 
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Belgium), or is referred to in the context of the source of sovereignty: Italy, 
Art. 1.; France, Art. 3.—where sovereignty pertains to the people; Spain Art. 
1.2—where the people are the depository of sovereignty; Portugal is one of the 
few exceptions where there is direct reference to state sovereignty.) 
 Since EU membership affects sovereignty, and arguably the independence 
of Eastern European states, it is understandable that the independence and 
sovereignty clauses are therefore seen as obstacles, to integration. The importance 
of these provisions is increased not only because they touch upon foundational 
issues but also as a result of the pro-independence public sentiment. The 
population in nation-states with newly recognized or regained sovereignty is 
understandably sensitive to issues of independence. Opposition politicians are 
ready to bring up the issue hoping for increased popularity in a society where 
popular culture traditionally honors (unsuccessful) heroes of independence. 
Moreover, the cultural and the legal elite are often keen on emphasizing 
independence as a fundamental constitutional principle (because of the consti-
tutional wording and independence dreams in the legal traditions). Both the 
general public sentiment and the ongoing political conflicts explain why 
constitutional amendments intended for accommodating the operations of the 
Union are sometimes rather narrow.  
 By way of comparison it is worthwhile noting that the various approaches 
of transferring competence within the Europe clauses are essentially compatible 
with the prevailing continental constitutional solutions that emerged in the 
post-Maastricht context. The East European accession countries have carefully 
considered the constitutional solutions adopted in the Member States after 
Maastricht. The EU made it a priority to provide a knowledge base of expertise 
in this area. Given the increasing uncertainty of the nature of the Union, its 
identity, mission and decision making powers at the time the accession clauses 
were being written into the respective constitutions, it is understandable why 
some accession countries were reluctant to take a final position on the transfer 
of powers and competencies to the Union. The Latvian amendment, for 
example, expressly considers the accession to be subject to revision by way 
of a referendum that can be initiated by the people. Lithuania’s amendment 
of Art. 136 also contains a safeguard clause: “The Republic of Lithuania 
participates in international organizations if such participation does not 
contradict interests of the state and its independence.” However, the Europe 
clause states that it expressly “transfers to the EU the competencies of the 
national institutions in the fields foreseen in the Founding Treaties of the EU, 
so that it shall be entitled to implement common competencies with other EU 
member states in those fields.”  
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B. Referendum—Instrumentalism and lack of deliberative democracy 
 
Given the concern with independence and (popular) sovereignty and because 
of the fundamental changes that will occur as a result of accession, all the 
Eastern European countries concerned opted for a referendum to sanction 
accession (or the accession treaty). This was irrespective of whether this form 
of popular support is prescribed by the constitution or not as was the case of 
Hungary until the 2002 amendments, or Poland (where this is a matter of choice). 
Indeed, some of the constitutions were amended so that they include the 
requirement of confirmation by referendum. It would be expected that those 
firm believers in popular sovereignty (i.e. that sovereign power resides in the 
people) would welcome this position. However, with the significant exception 
of Lithuania,11 the Eastern European accession countries (which do constitu-
tionally and doctrinally endorse the position of popular sovereignty) have been 
keen on avoiding referendum and plebiscite. For instance there was no 
referendum even in the case of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Mobilizing 
for a referendum has always been a problem because of the quorum difficulties. 
Hungary barely satisfied the fifty per cent participation requirement in the case 
of the Hungarian NATO accession referendum. All previous referenda ended 
unsuccessfully in Slovakia where the law on referendum requires (as it was the 
case in Hungary) that voter turn-out must be higher than 50 percent of all 
registered voters in order for the referendum to be valid. Also many previous 
attempts at holding a referendum were perceived by the Eastern European 
political establishment as populist attempts to undermine the parliamentary 
constitutional order. (For the actual destabilizing effects of the use of referenda 
see its use in the power struggles between the Parliament and the President 
of Ukraine and similarly in Moldova.12) It is quite telling that the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court, although in principle a protector of the individual political 
right to referendum, systematically restricted the applicability of referendum 
declaring various initiatives to be disguised attempts at amending the Consti-


 
11
 The Lithuanian constitution stresses the constitutional and constituent importance of 
referendum from its moment of creation. Art. 9.1 provides that on matters of fundamental 
importance affecting the population or the country referendum be held. Note that the 
independence of Lithuania was restored through a 1991 referendum that was the culmination 
of mass resistance to Soviet rule. 
 
12
 For a review of the use of referenda see Dorsen, N.–Rosenfeld, M.–Sajó, A.–Baer, S.: 
Comparative Constitutionalism. West, 2003. ch. 3. 
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tution. The Hungarian Constitution was amended in 1997 to the effect of 
curtailing the use of referendum as a device of change.13 
 On the one hand a theory of constituent power that denies the right of 
popular initiative in this context is perhaps an odd one but, on the other hand, 
it is quite understandable with regard to constitutional stability: a value that 
was considered crucial in the early formative years of the new democracies.  
 Notwithstanding the lack of constitutional positions, and the remarkable 
legitimacy of the available specific parliamentary process,14 the political elites 
of all East European countries sensed (without any specific discussion) that 
accession needs a plebiscite-like popular endorsement. In a way, a referendum 
is not the preferred constitution amending procedure in the case of these easy-
to-amend constitutions, neither is the tool of referendum intended to become 
the choice even after the current round of amendments. In fact, in most 
countries the mechanism foreseen to handle future constitutional amendments 
resulting from EU developments excludes the referendum (although Estonia 
and Latvia are somewhat ambiguous exceptions). The governments’ desire of 
popular legitimation resulted in one-time solutions regarding referendum, yet 
exceptionalism in constitutional matters is always a cause for concern. 
 It is possible that the use of a referendum will create certain expectations 
with regard to future constitutional amendments and EU constitutional 
changes. The currently prevailing anti-referendum constitutional pattern seems, 
however, unchanged. Indeed, at least in Hungary (but not in the Czech Republic) 
the political elite finds that there is no need to accept the European Consti-
tution via referendum because low level endorsement would be seen as a vote 
of non-confidence in the government; a referendum would provide additional 
opportunities for the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition to 

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13
 The amendment was adopted by the socialist-liberal coalition ruling at the time, which 
disposed of a parliamentary supermajority sufficient to constitutional amendment. The 
provision became an obstacle in 2003 for the same coalition which currently has only a 
narrow majority. Because the socialist-liberal coalition restricted the use of referendum 
they could not and will not be able to bypass the resistance of the opposition in accession 
matters by calling a referendum (where they probably would have a clear majority); the 
special terms of the one time referendum on accession required the consent of the opposition. 
 
14
 Wyrzykowski, M.: European Clause: Is it a Threat to Sovereignty? In: Wyrzykowski, 
M. (ed.): Constitutional Cultures [Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw M (2000)]. at 278 
indicates that a large coalition is needed for ratification. The Polish Constitution is prudent 
enough to enable parliamentary majority to go to the country via referendum in order to 
circumwent stalemate and opposition blackmail. The Hungarian socialists, when in power, 
ruled out that possibility through a constitutional amendment. That possibility, of course, 
determines the opportunistic behavior of the parliamentary opposition of the day. 
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impose its will on the government. Such considerations are clearly pragmatic 
and instrumentalist. Of course, within the Union, as the 2002 Irish referendum 
indicates, the allowance for a referendum remains an important popular control 
device over executive activities. “It is clear that retained powers of the people 
may force government to bring about greater domestic scrutiny of EU 
legislative proposals in advance of the referendum.”15 Without such a device 
the executive will gain further powers. 
 
C. A new separation of powers in the Union: further loss of popular-
democratic control  
 
The most fundamental (substantive and procedural) changes in the Eastern 
European constitutional systems, laws, institutions, and societies will occur in 
the years immediately proceeding accession. It is only at that significant 
moment that an entirely new institutional mechanism will redefine these 
relations. Most of these changes will not be reflected in the constitutions unless 
there will be fundamental changes in the Union itself through the emerging 
constitutional framework. The interpretation of the constitutions and the extra-
constitutional interpretation of sub-constitutional laws and institutions in 
political practices will, however, reflect these changes.  
 The constitutions of the new member states so far poorly reflect the shifts 
in decision-making. The current amendments address the role of the legislative 
branch in the formulation of future European policies and legislation in a 
minimalist way, allowing in practice the increase of the power of the executive. 
The amendments were adopted following instrumentalist considerations and 
as part of ordinary party politics. The prevailing solution limits the role of 
national Parliaments in the shaping of European decisions to that of a 
consultative body.16  
 In fact the powers of most parliaments will diminish and in some respect 
the powers of the executive will further increase especially in the case of those 

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15
 Hogan, G.: European Union Law and National Constitutions: Ireland. FIDE XX 
Congress, London 2002) www.fide2002.org 24. 
 
16
 The model of consultative status for national parliament in the EU decision-making 
relies on the German model. Today many observers find this to be an insufficient solution 
for a parliamentary representative democracy, although contrary to Hungary or the Czech 
Republic the German government is subject to more stringent control, given the structure 
of joint-decision making in certain federal areas. In other words, because of the federal 
structure there is more power retained by Land legislative bodies, including through the 
Bundesrat. Of course, the Bundesrat does not genuinely fit the model of an elected 
representative body, since it is composed of non-elected Land government representatives. 
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Eastern European countries where the matter is simply pushed under the 
carpet. However because of the current cabinet dictatorship in most Eastern 
European countries the legislative branch is already weak by design. The 
emerging new division of powers takes away Parliament’s legislative powers 
in matters that are of Union competence and renders unclear those legislative 
powers related to implementing legislation, that is if such powers will be 
retained by the national Parliament at all. In addition the present constitu-
tionally provided control powers of parliament (relating to fundamental rights 
protection that require some form of supermajority in some East European 
countries) will erode. These developments will contribute to an increasing 
sense of loss of popular control over the nation’s destiny and the irrelevance of 
constitutional institutions.  
 
D. Does the European Constitutional System provide constitutionalism for the 
new member states?17 
 
The lack of transparent popular representation may not be the ideal beginning 
for the people of the new member states about to set foot on a common 
European path that is leading to a partially uncharted European decision making 
process without full representation (or with a new complex representative 
system based on partial representation). The representative element of the 
concept of the representative government is at stake. It is unlikely that people 
will be compensated for this loss of representative democracy by direct elections 
to the European Parliament. The further loss of importance of the national 
parliaments fits into an existing European trend. Weiler refers to a “flexible” 
Europe with a “core” “at its center” that “will actually enable that core to retain 
the present governance system dominated by the Council—the executive branch 
of the Member States—at the expense of the national parliamentary democracy. 
Constitutionally, the statal structure would in fact enhance even further the 
democracy deficit.”18 (Emphasis added.) The national legislative branches are 
the losers. Given the current constitutional arrangements, namely the lack of 
competence and information in national Parliaments as well as parliamentarians’ 
defective capacity to handle the issues that are to be determined by the 
Council, Parliaments will not be able to defend the subsidiarity principle even 
if there were national or Union powers to that regard in the future. On the other 


 
17
 I am not considering here the rule of law and human rights enhancing contribution of 
the Union to the new member states–here the advantages are more obvious. 
 
18
 Weiler, J. H. H.: Conclusions. note 4. (Conference paper) Europe 2004–Le Grand 
Débat: Setting the Agenda and Outlining the Options. Brussels, 15 and 16 October 2001. 
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hand the national executive will be in the position to push through policies in 
the Council that it would not be able to push through its own Parliament 
because opposing public opinion, or majority (or coalition) party interests, or 
supermajority requirements would present insurmountable obstacles.19  
 On the basis that alternative forms of democracy are rather weak in East 
European civil societies, the European “democracy deficit” will be reproduced 
(in different forms) locally. However, this negative consequence might be 
countered by other consequences of membership. Furthermore given that 
European integration “has been, historically, one of the principal means with 
which to consolidate democracy within and among several of the Member States, 
both old and new, with less than perfect historical democratic credentials,”20 
accession may well have a beneficial overall effect on the quality and strength 
of the kind of democracy, or at least rule of law and political civility, practiced 
in the countries to join.  
 The transfer of powers from national Parliaments to the Council reshapes 
the fundamental relations among the branches of power in the respective 
member states without any public participation or even any public cognition of 
the new development. One may argue that in the parliamentary systems that 
prevail in Eastern Europe the separation of powers does not offer much 
protection against abuse of power anyway. Parliamentary systems per se are 
weak substitutions of the working model of a robust democracy based on long 
standing traditions. Therefore there is not much to lose in the Europeanization 
process. However, the constitutional performance of the new states was 
surprisingly good in the last decade. Even if parliamentary representation and 
traditional checks and balances are weakened, there are other sources of 
legitimacy such as government efficiency. The above concerns are motivated by 
abstract principles of the theory of democratic representation. To use normative 
claims is perhaps somewhat misguided in this case. After all, the existing 
parliaments have never had a decisive influence on the executive but have 
merely served as transmission belts that convey the results of popular elections 
through the mechanism of the formation of the cabinet. 
 It can certainly be said that from a constitutionalist perspective, and contrary 
to a democratic theory perspective, the new “allocation of powers” is not 
objectionable per se. In fact the likelihood of power concentration within a single 
hand is further diminished. The arrangement, however, does not automatically 

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19
 Consider, among others Pernice, I.: Der Parlamentarische Subsidiaritätsausschuss. 
Walter Hallstein-Institut WHI–Paper 11/02. Berlin, September 2002), www.whi-berlin. 
de/pernice-psa.htm.  
 
20
 Weiler: above n. 18, 220. 
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increase the power of the people via improved self-determination. Given 
these preconditions and because of the fact that the accession constitutional 
amendments did not arise as a consequence of a crisis, one should not expect 
more robust national Parliaments debating European issues. The trends that 
emerged in the Nation State (the domination of the executive in the welfare 
administrative state) are not challenged through the process but were able to 
determine the constitutional regime of accession. A Constitutional safeguard of 
efficient governmental information to Parliaments and people regarding 
pending EU decisions, or lack thereof, makes no difference here.  
 The consequences of the constitutionalisation of accession do not necessarily 
enhance constitutionalism. The whole process is marked by ad hockery and 
most steps taking the new member states into the Union remain within the 
ordinary and quite open horse trading between opposition and majority. The 
political elites of Eastern Europe opted for an accession referendum. This 
looks like a gamble: the issue is not popular deliberation but demonstration of 
loyalty via plebiscite. The legal discussion is primarily about expediency of 
the procedure (see Slovenia), and political discourse is replaced by guesswork 
about quorum and majorities. This is hardly an example of taking people 
seriously. 
 At first glance it seems that national parliamentarism, the quintessential 
form of democratic government in the public imagery and a bulwark against 
executive tyranny, is going down the drain. However, this is not necessarily 
the message coming from the European Union. In view of the EU Treaty 
Parliaments remain important: 
 — in exercising political scrutiny of the positions adopted by their 
respective governments within the Council;  
 — in establishing cooperative relations with other parliaments in the EU; 
 — in drafting and implementing EU law;  
 In addition, the draft EU Constitution provided for additional opportunities 
and powers to national Parliaments. These new opportunities would have included 
direct and (more or less timely) notification regarding planned European 
legislation and opportunities of recourse, formally independent of the national 
executive in matters of abuse of the subsidiarity principle. One could argue, 
however, that these possibilities are not genuine possibilities for national 
parliaments as the identifiable instruments of representative government. The 
direct impact of national representative governments on the European Parliament 
(through national delegates of Parliaments who might have binding mandate) 
disappeared with the system of direct elections. The proposal to create a second 
chamber representing national Parliament has never been popular. It is true that 
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there is a certain sentiment that national Parliaments deserve special attention in 
the European legislative process for reasons of democratic representation, 
“being close to citizens”21 rather than for reasons of national sovereignty. But 
the prevailing understanding is that powers in the Union emanate from the EU 
Constitution, even with regard to constitutionally established matters of sub-
sidiarity. 
 Even with improved possibilities of early warning of Parliaments (as light of 
past experience, that national Parliaments will make use of these suggested in 
the European draft Constitution) one cannot take for granted, in the oppor-
tunities. Moreover, given the remaining opportunities of national parliamen-
tary involvment, the position of the parliament might be that of defensor of 
national interests. Especially in case of the subsidiarity recourse it might be 
embarassing for the majority to endorse a position against the one that the 
executive has endorsed. On the other hand, and with particular relevance to new 
member states which are in the shadow of suspicion of being inculcated by 
nationalism, the opposition of the day might be inclined to castigate the majority 
and the government for giving up the national interest by not taking a clear 
position against a Commission position or a piece of European legislation that 
might be challenged on subsidiarity grounds. In this scenario national Parlia-
ments may become the forum of nationalism.  
 Of course, the demise of national parliaments, even if it occurs, does not 
rule out alternative forms of parliamentarism, and more broadly, a deliberative 
democracy. The European Parliament offers a form of expression of popular 
will. How deliberative the European legislative process will be is a matter to be 
seen. What is more obvious is that the European parliamentarism, deliberatly 
and to a great extent, offers representation for the European identity of their 
electors, as the system allows for less effective national interest representation 
(in the sense of primordial national interest).  
 Certain features of the European Parliament might have negative impacts 
on the public in the new member states. For representatives coming from 
smaller countries there is little they can do about the nationalistic sensibilities 
of their electors. For small states the elected representatives will have no 
chance to represent successfully nationalistic interests. As they join big pan-
European factions where blocs of larger countries dominate they will be 
dissolved and disappear in this distant formation. It is unlikely that the activities 
of the Parliament will satisfy the nationalistic expectations of the public in a 
small country. This might increase a sense of abandonment of national interests 

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 See e.g. French Convention representative Haenel, H.: http://european-convention.eu. 
int/docs/wd4/3640.pdf 
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and add to the feeling that there is no genuine representation at the European 
level.  
 One could argue that Senate members in the US are also popularly elected 
in their state constituency without losing their state-interest representation 
capacity. But the differences are formidable both in terms of the constituency 
and the way the representation is organized in the two systems. The constituency 
difference can be explained in reference to the planned motto of the European 
Constitution: representation in Europe is about unity in diversity; in the US 
diversity within unity that prevails. As to the constituency, the European MP 
represents a nationality—his electors are mostly of the same nationality, and of 
the same state. All US Congressmen are elected by Americans, who might have 
local (state or substate level) interests or ethnic affiliation. A congressman 
elected in a predominantly black, Jewish or Irish district (and most districts do 
not have such profile) will represent Americans first, with some ethnic positions 
on a few issues. This is not the case in Europe where the districts create clearly 
national constituencies, however, the representatives are forced to abandon this 
implicit mandate where it is dictated by (party) ideology, by European party 
discipline, and, most of all, by sheer numbers. 
 The logic of European legislation satisfies certain conditions of deliberative 
democracy, not necessarily because of the dialogue within the Parliament but 
because of the inter-institutional dialogue. Unfortunately this discussion is 
likely to remain non-transparent. Furthermore one cannot take for granted that 
the system has the potential to remedy the problem of bureaucratic-administrative 
homogeneity that characterizes executive legislation22 and that is a major 
problem at the national level in regard to the implementation of European law 
(directives being implemented bypassing the legislation, via executive regulation). 
The problem of administrative homogeneity (“like-mindedness”) remains where 
the interaction is between central (European) administrators and likeminded 
national administrators. (These latter are “like-minded” because of a pro-
European training.) And even where there is interaction with the elected 
European or even national Parliaments these might share the administrative 
European ethos too. (See the impact on legislation and robust democracy of the 
composition of the legislature in Germany where civil servants are elected to 
Parliament in great numbers.)  

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 Executive legislation in the administrative state runs the risk “of a situation in 
which like-minded people are pressing one another toward an unjustifiable position.” 
Sunstein, C. R.: Designing Democracy. What Constitutions Do. New York, Oxford 
University Press 2001. 141. Sunstein argues that control of delegated legislation is a 
remedy. 
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 The nature of European Union law further diminishes the positive impact 
of the inter-institutional dialogue as fundamental problems are left unsettled, 
either because of subsidiarity or due to unprincipled political, intergovern-
mental, or inter-institutional compromises that leave matters unresolved or for 
decision-making at the national level, which often means exclusively executive 
legislation, to the detriment of public deliberation. The politically uncotrolled 
executive regulation means that the implementing regulation is prepared and 
enacted within the civil service. It is here that the insufficient constitu-
tional/rule of law experience and the interest in democratic control will impose 
a high cost on the new member states. It is likely that in these countries there 
will be no public or institutional insistance that regulatory matters, other than 
dealing directly with fundamental constitutional rights restriction, be regulated 
in parliamentary processes. At least the Hungarian draft law on the legislative 
process prepared by the Ministry of Justice in 2003 intends to further restrict 
the domain of parliamentary law, enabling the executive to write the implenting 
legislation. One can already foresee the nature and qualities of regulations 
written by overwhelmed bureaucrats whose main concern is to have the norm 
pushed through without conflicts, and irrespective of constitutional, rule of 
law, or efficiency considerations. Of course, there are important reasons for 
this avoidance of Parliament: namely the dangers of delay and overpoli-
ticization. But given the lack of commitment in the public bureacracy to 
constitutional/rule of law values it is at this deeper level that the fears regarding 
insufficient commitment to the rule of law seem appropriate. The political elite 
is not ready (yet?) to reshape the procedure allowing for more costly, rule of 
law commited procedures, partly because the same elite has an instrumental 
attitude to law: it is satisfied with the semblance of due process etc. This is a 
political elite that looks at politics as a matter of interest based horse trading, 
where principled positions are laughed at. 
 Note further that the East European civil service is not responsive to the 
public. Its leaders are not elected and for good reasons. Such arrangements 
contribute to diminished democratic accountability. Such trends might be 
reinforced in the environment of the European administrative state. The European 
administrative state has to work as an impartial entity (with regard to national 
interests). A democratically elected executive that controls the administrative 
structures would politicize the whole Union. The legitimacy of the civil service 
is unrelated to the democratic legitimation of the leaders, both at the European 
and member state level. The contrast is clear with the United States.23 National 


 
23
 The prevailing US doctrine that allows administrative discretion is formulated in 
Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Agencies are 
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courts have no power to review the implementation legislation as it is a matter 
of community law. 
 Notwithstanding the above, the long term perspectives are not hopeless for 
constitutionalism in the new member states. After all, the emerging supra-
national separation of powers adds to that what remains of separation of 
powers at the national level. With regard to restricting the chances of elected 
dictatorship the changes are favourable to constitutionalism. It will take time to 
learn to live with, use and perhaps appreciate the new constitutional arrange-
ment where the traditional branches of power operate within (and complement) 
networks of interest representations which have limited democratic legitimation 
and partial representativity. It is possible that these alternative interest 
representations will operate as new checks and balances: it certainly does not 
satisfy traditional expectations of democracy and popular representation but 
may perhaps provide counterbalances and at the same time contribute to a 
more efficient steering of the European administrative state. To the extent the 
Union is indeed an administrative state (with an overloaded bureaucracy 
composed of generalists) it does not presuppose much democratic control 
through national parliaments, and even through a Union level parliament.  
 
 
II. Welfarism and the perpetuation of the state-socialist endowment effect 
 
Given that citizens of the new member states have limited political and practical 
opportunities as well as material and intellectual means to determine their own 
fate, and that this limitation is neither disguised nor regretted in prevailing 
Eastern European political cultures, the traditional patterns of a welfare 
dependent, anti-modernist complaint-subject might be reinforced. By “complaint-
subject” I mean citizens who behave like subjects of a paternalist state, who 
refuse to take responsibility for their fate through democratic participation, and 
whose “voice” (Hirschman) remains limited to complaints. People complain 
about their personal bad luck and the bad luck of their national history, and 
about mistreatment by insensitive politicians, and lack of honesty and decency 
of other people, in particular of those who appear to be successful. Political 
attitudes and action of the East European citizen remain one of complaint 
(hence the pattern of protest vote). The complaints include dissatisfaction with 
                               
authorized to interpret ambiguous legislative terms as they think it fit, as long as the 
interpretation is reasonable. Courts are expected to defer to the administrative interpretation 
of statutes. However, contrary to Europe, the American executive is popularly legitimated. 
The European and member state bureaucracies are without any popular legitimation. 
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welfare provisions. It should be noted that welfarism is particularly present in 
Hungary with a 54 per cent rate of welfarist redistribution (that is 54 per cent 
of the GNP). Similar problems and welfarist-populist resistance to or reluctance 
to reduce welfare spending on the middle class is present in the Czech Republic 
and Poland. These three largest accession countries face considerable budget 
deficits. 
 As mentioned above, popular democratic control in the post-communist 
countries will not be enhanced after accession. Moreover, and partly related to 
the emerging European decision-making process, the legacy of state socialism 
will be reinforced; namely socialist welfare dependence will be reinforced by 
the prevailing solidarity culture of the Union. The Union is programmed to 
promote welfare as the source or precondition of European homogeneity. This 
will have perverse effects in many new member states. The prevailing inherited 
attitude of the majority of the population in the new member states is that the 
State should provide all sorts of services for free, irrespective of individual 
contribution and need assessment. (Needless to say this may not correspond to 
the principle of social solidarity even though it may not be in conflict with the 
European practices that emerge in the name of social solidarity). Most political 
parties and governments have subscribed to this popular/populist attitude. This 
primitive theory of entitlements has been elevated to a theory of “subjective 
rights” in Hungary; that “theory” is voiced by government and opposition and 
sanctioned by the decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court.24 Social 
rights serve as the basis of government provided services, which are taken 
for granted for all citizens. The attitude is inherited from socialism—the state 
socialist system provided all sorts of services in exchange for political 
loyalty and to a great extent irrespective of merit and economic inefficiency 
consequences. The resulting inefficiencies made the state socialist system 
unsustainable. However, the welfare expectations continued to operate in 
conformity with what one could expect on the basis of the endowment effect. 
People are generally inclined to ask much more for selling a good they possess 
than they are ready to pay, if asked to buy it. People estimate very highly the 
services which were already provided, although they would be reluctant to pay 
for such services. Such attitude is generally quite irrational, especially where it 
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 Likewise the Polish Tribunal, in the Pension cases. For Hungary, see Sajó, A.: How 
the Rule of Law Killed Welfare Reform, East European Constitutional Review, 5 (1996) 
31–41. 
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helps to maintain very inefficient and costly bureaucracies, as it is the case in 
the post-communist countries (see, in particular the healthcare system).25  
 Endowed welfarism has proven to be quite popular. This popularity is not 
limited to Eastern Europe although richer countries may afford it more. It is a 
typical middle class attitude that favors, among others, the maintenance of 
universal services. The attitude was masterfully summarized in a dissenting 
opinion of Justice Kilényi of the Hungarian Constitutional Court.26 Justice 
Kilényi argued that social rights are to be understood in conjunction with the 
constitutional right to social security. Social security is far more than the right to 
a social existence minimum (i.e. subsistence support). It is a constitutional right 
that pertains to all (individuals and families), “irrespective of differences in 
wealth”. It includes the obligation of the state not to interfere with the material 
conditions of the citizens in a way that imposes on the masses of citizens 
burdens that are disproportionate and exceed their possibilities. At the beginning 
of 1995 the Hungarian Constitutional Court repeatedly protected existing, non-
contribution based social services as statutory entitlements amounting to 
acquired rights that cannot be repealed, at least not until the recipients had 
sufficient time and opportunity to find alternative protection. The Court and, 
increasingly, most political parties accepted that general entitlements, unrelated 
to needs assessment are “subjective rights” and pertain to all.  
 The social welfare dependency that is rooted in the endowment effect had 
dramatic fiscal consequences. Universal services that were inherited from 
socialism were of a nominally high quality. As a result of different populist-
electoral policies, at least some of these services were further extended after 
the collapse of state socialism. The state could not sustain these services, or 
their level (quality), except at the price of excessive taxes with negative impact 
on investment and increasing government debt that imposed increasing fiscal 
burden on economic development. At the moment when the requirements of 
the Stability and Growth Pact became a concern to the new member states and 
the governments, certain governments attempted to reduce the budget deficit. 
There was a general public outcry against any attempt to move towards a needs 
assessment based welfare system. It has to be admitted that the gross income 
of the population is HUF 1,1 m (4,000 Euros) with an average of 28 per cent 
income tax and approximately another 11 per cent social security tax. (Only 4 
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 Posner argues that endowment effects are rational if the disparity reflects the unique 
character of the goods in question – unique in the sense of lacking close substitutes. This is 
certainly not the case of the welfare services which are (or would be) available on the 
market. Posner, R.: Economic Analysis of Law. 5th edition, New York, 1999. 95. 
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 26/1993 (IV.29.) AB hat. [annualized increase of pensions below inflation upheld]. 
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per cent of the taxpayers reported more than HUF 4,000.000 annual gross 
income. As long as the tax remains high (40 per cent above the 4,000 Euro 
bracket) there is no disposable income for social services and the population is 
not in the position to make informed choices, though in the given system the 
level of services deteriorates.  
 It is likely that the welfare expectations attitude will be reinforced ideo-
logically in the Union. Further, to some extent such tendencies might be 
reinforced on the basis of the specific rules of the secondary legislation of the 
Union that reflect welfarist concerns but correspond to the possibilities of 
much more affluent societies. (It is a matter of conflict for the future how the 
new member states will satisfy the budget deficit, and national debt reduction, 
etc. requirements of the Euro zone.) The solidarity-inspired and other socialistic 
provisions of the Treaty/Constitution will enhance the attitude of middle class 
welfare dependence. 
 The European attitude was well exemplified in draft Constitution that 
continued to enhance the idea that a high level of health protection is to be 
provided under nationally determined systems as promoted by Union policies.27 
To the extent that this points to an all-European standard the pressure on the 
weaker national economies to maintain free, or below market price services 
will continue. Note that the per capita health care spending in Germany exceeds 
at least sevenfold the Hungarian per capita expenditure, though in terms of the 
respective percentages of the national budgets the two countries are not funda-
mentally different. However, the Hungarian expenses are almost exclusively 
covered on the basis of a national insurance system that runs into major deficit, 
covered by the budget.28  
 I would like to illustrate the welfarist burden on the new member states 
(with the already mentioned consequences of welfare dependency reinforce-
ment and negative impacts on economic development) with a more specific 
example that originates in the secondary legislation on commercial activities. 
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 
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 Art. II-35: Health care. 
 Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from 
medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high 
level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of 
all Union policies and activities.  
 
28
 The health care expenditure looks non-sustainable in its present system of administ-
ration based on an allegedly “acquired right”. Attempts to reform the system run into the 
resistance of the well organized medical profession and the pharmaceutical industry, 
supported by the opposition of the day, claiming that any reform imposing direct costs on the 
population violates people’s rights. 
212 ANDRÁS SAJÓ 
  
March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) requires 
that universal service be made available at “affordable price” (Article 3. 2.). 
Annex IV specifies that such duty implies averaged prices or the provision of 
specific tariff options for consumers with low incomes. The resulting loss to 
the operator has to be recovered from contributions from the other under-
takings (who will charge more to their users). I am sure that even Adam Smith 
would offer some arguments for such arrangements referring to public goods; 
modern economists would talk about positive network externalities. Further, 
solidarity might provide additional justification for such arrangements. For 
example emergency calls will be available to all. However, what are the 
implications of such logic where large numbers of the population are of low 
incomes? That the affected companies (sectors) will lose their competitivity. 
 Welfarist provisions in European Union law, similar to the above mentioned 
examples are of considerable importance for reinforcing socialist mentalities 
of endowment and post-socialist welfare institutions with all the inherent 
inefficiencies, unfairness (middle class bias) and non-sustainability that it entails. 
 After all, the quoted welfarist provisions of European Union law seem to 
reflect the same welfarist perspective that the national parliaments have inevitably 
accepted in response to democratic pressure. Such language and policies might 
be attributed to the self understanding of the administrative welfarist state. The 
Union’s institutions and networks are not catering to welfarism and function to 
some extent as buffers against self-destructive welfarism of democracy at the 
national level. Nevertheless, the comprehensive language of the Union seems 
to mimic what would have resulted from traditional popular representative 
democracy. This may not be decisive where particular policies are left to 
independent networks without a welfare-oriented redistributive mission. It 
should be added quickly that all this is intended to indicate a possible trend 
only, a trend that at this moment is undermined by at least three facts. Firstly, 
the Union does not have much power of direct reallocation as this remains 
within the budgetary powers of national parliaments. Secondly, the transfers 
of the Union are certainly and perversly redistributive (see CAP). Thirdly, there 
are genuine efforts to recreate representative government or a network of 
representative governments at the Union level that might respond to (or resist) 
the same redistributionist democratic impulses that characterize national 
parliaments.  
 
 
